Document(s) 11 de 11

Interpretations of globalization: an overview
A fractured global order
The knowledge fracture and the two civilizations
Concluding remarks

The multiplicity of changes and trends reviewed in the preceding chapter indicate that an accelerated, segmented, and uneven process of globalization is under way. The worldwide expansion of productive and service activities, the growth of international trade, the diminishing importance of national frontiers, and the intensive exchange of information and knowledge throughout the world coexist with a concentration of “global” activities in certain countries, regions, even neighbourhoods, and certain firms and corporations. The simultaneous integration and exclusion of countries — as well as of peoples within countries — are two intertwining aspects of the multidimensional processes of globalization and fragmentation under way in our turbulent period in history, a time that is witnessing the emergence of a fractured global order.

This chapter examines some of the interpretations offered to account for the process of globalization, proposes a characterization of the emerging fractured global order, and focuses on the knowledge fracture that is now creating a great divide between societies with the capacity to generate and use knowledge and those without it. The processes leading to a fractured global order have major implications for development finance and international cooperation, which will be dealt with in the next two chapters.

Interpretations of globalization: an overview

Many interpretations have been offered to account for the complex trends leading to the emergence of a new world order (see Table 1 for a summary). A few examples will give an idea of the wide variety of concepts and metaphors proposed to apprehend and explain the new realities of the fractured global order.

Images and concepts of world order

Holm and Sorensen (1995) offer a framework to classify the forces that shape the emerging fractured global order in terms of two dimensions: type of process and scope of change. Along the first dimension, they differentiate two meanings of globalization. One considers globalization “as a somewhat trivial trend toward increasing interconnectedness between peoples and individuals. It is, moreover, identified by some observers as a cyclical trend, and it is not immediately clear that interconnectedness (including economic interdependence) has increased unremittingly over time.” The other meaning views globalization “as leading toward a fundamental, qualitative shift in the conditions of people’s lives. Globalization increases risks and opportunities for individuals who become both objects of and participants in global processes.” Furthermore, drawing on the contributions of the authors of their edited volume, particularly Sunkel (1995), they indicated that “the process of globalization is uneven both in intensity and in geographical scope and depth” (Holm and Sorensen 1995, pp. 4–7). Along the second dimension, which refers to the scope of globalization, they distinguish between considering globalization primarily in economic terms and viewing it as a broader process of social change. Table 2 summarizes their framework for the analysis of globalization.

Joseph Nye has viewed the new international situation as “a three-dimensional chess game,” with the United States the only player on the top, military board; three players — Europe, Japan, and the United States — on the middle, economic board; and many players on the bottom, transnational-relations board. According to Nye, the games played on these boards have become quite complex: “one must play games of power that are not only horizontal across any given board but at the same time vertical” (Nye 1994, p. 380).

Huntington has suggested that — rather than having a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar international system — we now have “a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and the several major powers,” which creates new tensions between the United States as the only superpower and several regional powers, such as Germany and France in Europe, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. These major powers “are preeminent in certain areas of the world without being able to extend their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States” (Huntington 1999, pp. 36–37). This state of affairs is presumably temporary, as Huntington predicts it will transform itself into a truly multipolar system during the 21st century

Meghnad Desai stressed the complex and unstable character of the relations between the major players in the international arena:

we have the paradox of unequally powerful nations, among which there is too little inequality to make one nation state dominant and too much inequality to establish a symmetrical framework of the Rule of Law. The world of nation states is neither ready for a Lockean contract for a democracy, nor for a Hobbesian Absolutist monarch. There are querulous barons of unequal size — too many for comfort — but with no one powerful enough to lay down the law.

(Desai 1995, p. 11, his emphasis)

Brazilian political scientist, Helio Jaguaribe, has seen two options for the evolution of the world order in the post-Cold War period. One of these options is the emergence of an “American World Empire,” in which the “hegemonic conditions of the United States” would be expanded and consolidated, a process that may happen regardless of the will of the American people. The other option is for the European Union to evolve well beyond economic and monetary integration and articulate a “common political project,” possibly complemented with a recovery of the Russian economy and the consolidation of China as a great international power, which would lead to a multipolar system with three levels. At the first level would be a few powers capable of having influence at the global level. They would form some kind of “World Directorate” operating directly or through the United Nations. At the second level would be countries with an important role in regulating the political and economic interests of a specific region, and at the third level would be the majority of countries, which would have no significant international role (Jaguaribe 1998).

For Richard Cooper, “confusion is a more apt term [at present] than order. We are at a climax of collapsing and changing orders” (Cooper 1993, p. 13). In his view, the colonial order, Cold War, balance-of-power system in Europe, and imperialist order have all collapsed. What is now emerging is “a divided world, but one that is divided quite differently from the days of the East-West confrontation” (Cooper 1993, p. 14). It comprises a premodern world in which there is no order and in which “the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the legitimate monopoly on the use of force” (Cooper 1993, p. 14); the modern world in which there is order, but also risks, and in which the nation-state is still the great engine of modernization; and a postmodern world in which “the state system is also collapsing, but unlike the pre-modern it is collapsing into greater order rather than into disorder” (Cooper 1993, p. 16). This accords with Peter Drucker’s remark that “we are not facing the ‘new world order’ today’s politicians so constantly invoke. Rather, we are facing a new world disorder — no one can know for how long” (Drucker 1993, p. 113).

Louis Emmerij introduced the metaphor of a “two-track” evolution of the world economy, according to which the developing world is falling far behind the rich nations, with little prospect for catching up. He argued that the world is entering into a new era that

is likely to be characterized by rapidly changing international competitive strengths and weaknesses as between different countries and regions; increasing globalization combined with growing multipolarity and thus fragmented economic hegemony; growing dualism among (and within) countries in terms of economic participation; and a growing impotence of purely national decision-making.

(Emmerij 1989, p. 25)

Jorge Nef argued that our conceptual frameworks must reflect the “complex, nuanced and dynamic nature of our age of extremes” and suggested that the changes we are experiencing fall under the following three categories: the “broader and long-ranging changes of our age of pervasive technology,” the “alterations in the ideologico-political matrix which define the cultural polarities of the system,” and the “alterations in the economic fabric of the world order,” which he defined as “perhaps the most important set of circumstances” at present (Nef 1995, p. 5).

In an attempt to make sense of what William Greider described as the “bewildering facts” of the emerging international order, he identified “four broad, competing power blocks — each losing or gaining influence over events.” These four blocks are labour, which is identified as the most obvious loser; national governments, which have lost ground on the whole; the multinational corporations, which are collectively “the muscle and brains” of the new system, and their success has “weakened labour and degraded the control of governments”; and finance capital, which is viewed as the “Robespierre of this revolution.” Global finance is seen as acting collectively as the “disinterested enforcer” of the imperative of “maximizing the return on capital without regard to national identity or political and social consequences.” Greider concluded that some form of regulation or control over global capital will be necessary to avoid the problems of uncertainty and instability that are now emerging into full sight, and which may create serious social and political upheavals (Greider 1997, pp. 24–25).

Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky argued that it is necessary to examine the “real world,” rather than focusing on the “world as it should be.” They have viewed the contemporary world as divided into two zones: “The key to understanding the real world order is to separate the world into two parts. One part is zones of peace, wealth and democracy. The other part is zones of turmoil, war and development.” They added that “unfortunately, only 15 percent of the world’s population lives in the zones of peace and democracy. Most people now live in zones of turmoil and development, where poverty, war, tyranny, and anarchy will continue to devastate lives.” Despite their pessimistic — they would argue, “realistic” — approach, Singer and Wildavsky managed to state confidently that “we have good reason to look forward to the current world order with hope and confidence. It will be better than any that preceded it” (Singer and Wildavsky 1993, pp. 3, 6, 12).

Dani Rodrik, a mainstream economist, has been concerned that globalization may lead to social disintegration and engender a backlash against trade expansion. For Rodrik, the processes associated with the worldwide integration of markets for goods, services, and capital are creating three sources of tensions:

First, reduced barriers to trade and investment accentuate the asymmetries between groups that can cross international borders ... and those that cannot. In the first category are owners of capital, highly skilled workers, and many professionals ... . Unskilled and semiskilled workers and most middle managers belong in the second category. ...

(Rodrik 1997, p. 4)

Second, globalization engenders conflicts within and between nations over domestic norms and the social institutions that embody them. As the technology for manufactured goods becomes standardized and diffused internationally, nations with very different sets of values, norms, institutions, and collective preferences begin to compete head on in markets for similar goods ... . Trade becomes contentious when it unleashes forces that undermine the norms implicit in domestic practices [workplace practices, legal rules, social safety nets].

(Rodrik 1997, p. 5)

Third, globalization has made it exceedingly difficult for governments to provide social insurance — one of their central functions and one that has helped maintain social cohesion and domestic political support for ongoing liberalization throughout the postwar period. ... The increasing mobility of capital has rendered an important segment of the tax base footloose, leaving governments with the unappetizing option of increasing taxes disproportionately on labour income.

(Rodrik 1997, p. 6)

Rodrik concluded that “the most serious challenge for the world economy in the years ahead lies in making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability” (Rodrik 1997, p. 2), which implies ensuring that international economic integration does not lead to domestic social disintegration.

Structures and forces in the world order

Yoshikazu Sakamoto has postulated that the Cold War and the international order emerging after its demise are particular manifestations “of a deeper contradiction that underlies modern historical developments” (Sakamoto 1994, pp. 18–19). This contradiction is expressed along three dimensions, which account for all major conflicts and changes in recent history: capitalism versus socialism, state nationalism versus internationalism, and democracy versus authoritarianism. Each of these dimensions is considered “a driving force that generates historical changes with a particular orientation toward ‘structuration’” (Sakamoto 1994, p. 19). This framework has been used by Sakamoto to place various historical processes in different regions; for example, a capitalism-nationalism-democracy model is seen to have obtained in what he has called the “advanced countries” of the West during the 19th century (Sakamoto 1994, p. 21), whereas a socialism-nationalism-authoritarianism model prevailed in the countries of the East block during the Cold War and characterizes China at present. Sakamoto also pointed out that one of the fundamental features of modern history is “uneven development” (Sakamoto 1994, p. 20), which is expressed in a variety of ways related to the three dimensions of the contradiction mentioned above, and he has stressed that the role of the state — as well as the roles of the market and civil society — varies in the different models of historical development.

Barbara Stallings put forward the idea that the emerging global order is the result of “two sets of interrelated changes that have taken place since the early 1980s.” The first is a “dramatic transformation of the international political economy,” which arose out of a significant shift in the political divisions of the world and a sharp increase in economic interdependence; the second is a “rapidly growing differentiation among third world countries” (Stallings 1995, p. 349). Stallings has attempted to reconcile what appear to be two different interpretations of these changes, one that “projects a continuation and deepening of the multilateral, interdependent global system,” and the other, which “argues that regionalism is the trend of the future” (Stallings 1995, p. 352). In her view, what we have at present is “a semiregionalized world economy — regionalized from the viewpoint of the third world countries, but much less so from the triad [Europe, Japan, the United States] perspective” (Stallings 1995, p. 353).

In the second edition of a rather influential book, Barry Jones put forward the view that the emergence of a new global economic order is marked by a sharp break with the past, leading to what he considered a paradigm shift of major proportions. He identified 16 elements that clearly mark this discontinuity — ranging from the rise of postindustrialism to the decline of ideology, to the availability of smart machines, to major transformations in demand and employment, among others — which are all rooted in the diffusion of major technological advances during the last few decades. He argued that the nature of work and employment has changed in a fundamental way and that this will necessarily lead to a reaccommodation in international economic relations (Jones 1995).

Rather than listing 16 major sources of discontinuity, as Jones did, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) examined 6 broad trends affecting large parts of the world: the spread of liberal democracy, the dominance of market forces, the integration of the global economy, the transformation of production systems and labour markets, the speed of technological changes, and the media revolution and consumerism. The UNRISD report concludes that “these processes may seem to operate independently and be part of the inevitable march of human progress. But, in reality, they are interdependent and shaped by strong political forces, determining who gains and who loses.” The report also argues that “technological advance would have inevitably speeded up and intensified international contacts. But the form of globalization has been shaped by, and continues to follow the contours of, existing international power relations.” UNRISD (1995) also highlighted the problems associated with the emergence of a global order, such as the growth in refugees, the international breakdown of law and order, the endless war on drugs, ethnic and religious conflicts, and civil wars, which require concerted international action to confront.

Other conceptual frameworks offered to apprehend the main features of the emerging global order stress the need to maintain the stability of the international system. For example, Kazuo Takahashi, editor of the report to the Global Commission for a Post-Cold War Global System (Takahashi 1992), has seen the contemporary world as fraught with conflict. He argued that “the emergence of a new global order is not yet in sight. Despite its precarious condition, the world society will have to deal with an increasing number of crisis situations in the period immediately ahead.” Therefore, according to the members of the Global Commission, as reported by Takahashi, “it is vitally important for the world community to formulate a long-term vision at a time when crisis management is the essential task of its political leaders” (Takahashi 1992, p. 14). The Global Commission’s vision emerged out of an appreciation of the changing parameters, actors, and structures of the emerging global society, which lead to two sets of scenarios. The first set comprises “evolutionary scenarios” based on strengthened global partnerships and a transition from regionalism to globalism, and the second set of “disruptive scenarios” results from the collapse of major powers, a global depression, worldwide economic disturbances, an intensification of national and ethnic conflicts, and the globalization of terrorism (Takahashi 1992, p. 69).

In contrast, focusing on international finance, Ethan Kapstein argued that there is already a system in place to help deal with some of the major instabilities and problems created by globalization. In his view, what he has called “international cooperation based on home country control” has evolved as a “two level structure, with international cooperation at the upper level and home country control below” (Kapstein 1994, p. 2). In the case of international finance, this structure has helped to maintain a balance between national regulation and international competition. It requires intensive consultations and negotiations between financing institutions and regulatory agencies at the national level, as well as between regulatory agencies in different countries. Kapstein also examined the cases of pollution from oil tankers and telecommunications and argued that “something of a generic policy solution to economic globalization has emerged in those issue-areas which threaten to unleash cross-border externalities (that is, unwanted events like pollution or a financial crisis) in the event of a systems breakdown.” In his view, even though “perhaps supranational agencies would provide the global economy with more effective supervision of multinational firms and transactions ... international cooperation based on home country control provides a way for national states to enjoy the benefits of interdependence while maintaining national responsibility for the sector in question” (Kapstein 1994, p. 180).

In Michael Bruno’s preface to the 1995 edition of the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, the former chief economist of the World Bank emphasized the ambiguous character of the globalization process and its opportunities and risks:

the ... central message is that the increasing integration of the developing countries into the global economy constitutes perhaps the most important opportunity for raising the welfare of both developing and industrial countries over the long term. But the process of integration will not without frictions that give rise to protectionist pressures. ... Globalization comes with liberalization, deregulation and more mobile and potentially volatile cross-border capital flows, which means that sound macroeconomic management command and increasingly high premium. Penalties for policy errors rise. Globalization thus requires closer monitoring and quicker policy responses at the country, regional, and global levels.

The process of integration will affect countries unevenly and could increase international disparities. ... The global outlook is in general bright, but masks wide differences across regions and countries — for many, global optimism coexists with local pessimism.

(Bruno 1995, p. 5)

Pessimism and resistance to globalization

However, in contrast to studies like Bruno’s, which have focused on both the benefits and costs of globalization, most accounts and interpretations of the emerging global order have expressed a rather pessimistic view of the prospects for developing countries. For example, in their examination of the implications of the emerging world order for developing countries, Slater et al. (1993, pp. 361–362) reached a gloomy conclusion:

for those countries that comprise much of the Third and Fourth Worlds, the picture remains bleak ... . There are tremendous obstacles to overcome as countries attempt to deal with an uneasy mix among political, social, and economic variables in a global system and isolates and marginalizes the most burdensome cases.

In The Economist’s 1994 annual survey of the global economy (The Economist 1994), it anticipated a “war of the worlds” between the “so-called industrial economies that dominate the globe” and the “newly emerging economic giants” during the next quarter century. It pointed out that shifts in economic power are rarely smooth and that “a number of people in the rich industrial nations are already urging their governments to prepare for battle against the upstarts,” which include the East Asian, Eastern European, and Latin American nations. Other authors have focused on the economic and political downside of the process of globalization, and some — such as Anderson (1994) and Sterling (1994) — have focused particularly on the spread of illegal activities, organized crime, and money laundering.

One of the most clear expressions of the pessimism with which analysts from the industrialized nations view the prospects of poor countries in the emerging global order was provided by Paul Kennedy:

as we move into the next century the developed economies appear to have all the trump cards in their hands — capital, technology, control of communications, surplus foodstuffs, powerful multinational companies — and, if anything, their advantages are growing because technology is eroding the value of labour and materials, the chief assets of developing countries.

(Kennedy 1993, p. 225, his emphasis)

Elaborating on this point of view, Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy characterized the emerging international order in the following terms:

Perhaps the global problem of the early twenty-first century is basically this: that across our planet a number of what may be termed demographic-technological fault lines are emerging, between fast-growing, adolescent, resource-poor, undercapitalized, and uneducated populations on one side, and technologically inventive, demographically moribund, and increasingly nervous rich societies on the other.

(Connelly and Kennedy 1994, pp. 78–79)

Kennedy’s perspective on the problems of the emerging international order appears to be marked by a sense of futility, perhaps even despair, although tempered by what may be called hopeless optimism:

in the unlikely event that governments and societies do decide to transform themselves, we ought to recognize that our endeavors might have only a marginal effect on the profound driving forces of today’s world. ... Nothing is certain except that we face innumerable uncertainties; but simply recognizing that fact provides a vital starting point ... . Thus, despite the size and complexity of the global challenges facing us, it is too simple and too soon to conclude gloomily that nothing can be done.

(Kennedy 1993, pp. 348–349)

Little wonder that the process of globalization has elicited many negative reactions. Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith edited a volume with 43 contributions, The Case Against the Global Economy and a Turn Toward the Local, gathering a plethora of arguments for resisting the forces of economic globalization. The gist of their case rests primarily on environmental considerations. As Goldsmith pointed out in the concluding chapter,

If the world’s environment is being degraded so rapidly, with a corresponding reduction in its capacity to sustain complex forms of life such as the human species, it is because it cannot sustain the present impact of our economic activities. To increase this impact still further, as we are doing by creating a global economy based on free trade, is both irresponsible and cynical. The only responsible policy must, on the contrary, be to drastically reduce this impact, and it is only in the sort of economy in which economic activities are carried out on a far smaller scale and cater primarily to a local or regional market that we can hope to do so

(Goldsmith 1996, p. 510, his emphasis).

A similar point was made by Tom Athanasiou, who argued that globalization has become “an euphemism for a commercial imperative unbuffered by ethical scepticism, care for the weak and vulnerable, environmental protection and even democracy.” In his view, the forces of globalization must be resisted, and “it is not too late to act, or to recall the old imperative to ‘educate, agitate, and organize,’ or to remember that the deepest springs of hope lie in engagement, in making the choice to make a difference” (Athanasiou 1996, pp. 44, 306, his emphasis).

This call to arms against globalization reaches a high point with the arguments of Samir Amin, for whom “the world system is in crisis. There is a general breakdown of accumulation, in the sense that most of the social formations of the East (formerly called socialist) and the South (third and fourth worlds) are unable to reproduce on an extended scale, or even in some cases to hold their own” (Amin 1992, p. 12). In Amin’s view, this crisis “constitutes a historical limit for capitalism,” and a solution to this problem would require “a reallocation of capital on a global scale that is unattainable under the short-term profitability criteria that now rule the market. A market solution of the problem is bound to generate growing social, national, and international imbalances that will turn out to be unbearable.” He argued for a “reconstruction of the world system on a polycentric basis” (Amin 1992, p. 13), which would require Third World countries to subordinate their relations with others to the imperatives of internal development, rather than adjusting their international agendas to the world expansion of capital. Without going as far as advocating autarky or self-exclusion from the world economy, Amin proposed a “delinking” strategy, as expressed in workers’ refusal to submit to “the demands of economistic alienation,” in political responses to natural-resource waste and environmental degradation, and in geopolitical and cultural conflicts between states and civilizations (Amin 1992, p. 14).

Despite all the warnings about the nefarious effects of globalization, the idea that the processes of globalization are moving swiftly and inexorably has remained unchallenged by any but a few analysts. For example, an article in Fortune magazine posed the question “Global — or Just Globaloney?” (Farnham 1994). Farnham argued that globalization is taking place in some narrow sectors of the world economy while the rest remains relatively untouched by the pressures of globalization. Following this line of reasoning, even though it is necessary to acknowledge the growing importance of the global reach of international finance, mass media, and certain industries, such as automobiles and computers, it is also important to remember that many segments of the world economy remain firmly anchored in, and even limited to, regional and local scales. This is particularly the case of many agricultural activities, small industries and crafts, a wide range of services of restricted geographical scope, and practically all activities linked to subsistence economies. Although it is difficult to estimate the proportion of the world’s population remaining outside the circuits of globalized production, trade, finance, and consumption, it is likely that a significant majority of those who live in the poor or developing regions do not take part in such activities and remain little affected by them.

Knowledge and culture as driving forces of global change

Most of the interpretations and accounts of the trends shaping the new international order, such as those reviewed in the preceding sections, put emphasis on economic and power relations between states and, to a lesser extent, on those between states and corporations. From this perspective, the main features of the emerging global order are explained in terms of economic, military, security, social, and political interactions between international actors. However, other authors privilege a different set of driving forces to explain the world order that is crystallizing as we move toward the 21st century: (1) knowledge acquisition, generation, and use; and (2) cultural values and attitudes.

Authors such as Machlup (1962, 1980), Drucker (1968, 1993), and Castells (1996) have consistently focused on the role that knowledge and information play in shaping the emerging international order. For example, according to Castells, we now live in a new economy — what he has called an “informational economy” — characterized by five main features related to each other in a systemic way: (1) the increasing dependence of the sources of productivity on the application of science and technology and the quality of information and management; (2) the shift taking place in advanced capitalist societies from material production to information processing in the proportion of GNP and in that of the population employed in these new activities; (3) the deep transformation in the organization of production and the economy in general; (4) the cross-border organization of capital, production, management, markets, labour, information, and technology in the new global economy; and (5) the fact that these economic and organizational changes are occurring in the context of one of the most important technological revolutions in history, which is based on information technology and has, with its major scientific discoveries and applications, transformed the material basis of the world in less than 20 years (Castells 1996).

The main consequence of all these changes is the emergence of a completely new world situation:

Toward the end of the second millennium of the Christian Era several events of historical significance have transformed the social landscape of human life. A technological revolution, centered around information technologies, is reshaping the material basis of society. Economies throughout he world have become globally interdependent, introducing a new form of relationship between economy, state, and society, in a system of variable geometry.

There has also been an accentuation of uneven development, this time not only between North and South, but between the dynamic segments and territories of societies everywhere, and those others that risk becoming irrelevant from the perspective of the system’s logic. Indeed, we observe the parallel unleashing of formidable productive forces of the informational revolution, and the consolidation of black holes of human misery in the global economy.

(Castells 1996, pp. 1–2).

Castells’ three-volume inquiry takes technology as a point of departure, even though he has placed this technological revolution “in the social context in which it takes place and by which it is being shaped.” Similar viewpoints have been expressed by Sagasti in a series of articles (1980, 1988, 1990, 1997a, b). Castells also argued against the false dilemma of technological determinism and emphasized the reciprocal influences between technology and its social context.

As indicated in the preceding chapter, one of the salient features of the emerging international order is the greater attention paid to cultural, religious, and ethical concerns. Indeed, Huntington argued that the world of the future will be characterized by “clash of civilizations,” in which cultural conflicts “along the fault lines between civilizations” will become more dangerous than economic or ideological conflicts (Huntington 1996, p. 28; see also Huntington 1993). Reviewing and discarding accounts of world order given in terms of “One world: Euphoria and Harmony,” “Two Worlds: Us and Them,” “184 States, More or Less,” and “Sheer Chaos,” Huntington concluded that

the post-Cold War world is a world of seven or eight major civilizations. Cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states. The most important countries in the world come overwhelmingly from different civilizations. The local conflicts most likely to escalate into broader wars are those between groups and states from different civilizations. The predominant patterns of political and economic development differ from civilization to civilization. The key issues on the international agenda involve differences among civilizations. Power is shifting from the long predominant West to non-Western civilizations. Global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational.

(Huntington 1996, p. 29).

Analysts who focus on culture and values as the main forces shaping the emerging international order tend to place Western civilization in a broader perspective and to emphasize the increasingly important role that non-Western cultures will play in the future. For example, Walker criticized the ethnocentrism implicit in the long-entrenched claims to universality of the various aspects of Western culture and anticipated that “we are entering an epoch that will be characterized increasingly by a clash of civilizations and a decline of the current hegemony of Western cultural forms” (Walker 1984, p. 3). Friberg and Hettne focused on the possible contributions of non-Western social movements to the emergence of “post-materialist” cultural forms that may respond better to concerns for the environment (Friberg and Hettne 1988, p. 356). Arguing that a “Green strategy has been independently developed in many locations,” they postulated that it will lead to “a truly global dialogue, ideology and movement with natural anchorage in all corners of the world” (Friberg and Hettne 1988, p. 358).

Jack Weatherford has forcefully argued that cultural variety plays a most important role in an increasingly global society. He noted that “the emergence of a world culture failed to obliterate local cultures. Instead, ethnic and cultural identities grew stronger, everywhere ... rather than blending into a homogenized world culture shared by all, the various tribes, nations, religions, and ethnic groups accentuated their differences to become more varied than ever.” He concluded that

Today all of us are unquestionably part of our global society, but that common membership does not produce cultural uniformity around the globe. The challenge now facing us is to live in harmony without living in uniformity, to be united by some forces such as worldwide commerce, pop culture and communications, but to remain peacefully different in other areas such as religion and ethnicity. We need to share some values such as commitment to fundamental human rights and basic rules of interaction, but we can be wildly different in other areas such as life-styles, spirituality, musical tastes, and community life.

(Weatherford 1994, p. 290)

This highly selective and rather succinct review of interpretations of the emerging world order illustrates the variety of perspectives taken on the simultaneous processes of globalization and fragmentation.⁷

There is no dearth of images and conceptual frameworks to account for the trends observed in the last two decades. It is also interesting to note that most of these interpretations have been provided by analysts from industrialized and rich nations. Therefore, without too much exaggeration, it may be possible to say that people in the South risk becoming passive consumers of the global futures dreamt for them in the North. This is particularly troublesome because of the pessimism prevailing among Northern analysts regarding the future prospects of poor countries and regions.

A fractured global order

From the perspective of the developing regions of the world, that is, from a noncentral (or excentric) point of view, the transition to the 21st century is marked by the emergence of a fractured global order (Sagasti 1989a, b, 1990). This is an order that is global but not integrated, that puts us all in contact with one another while simultaneously maintaining deep fissures between diverse groups of countries and between peoples within countries, and that is benefiting a small percentage of humanity while segregating a large portion of the world’s population.

The structure of the fractured global order can be conceptualized in terms of three closely interconnected and partially overlapping domains, each of which has its own specific features and ways of interacting with the other two: the domain of the global, that of the networks, and that of the local (Figure 1).

Figure 1. The three domains of the fractured global order.

The domain of the global comprises primarily the intensive, dense, and nearly instantaneous exchanges of symbols and intangible goods on a planetary scale, characteristic of the information age. Advances in information and communications technologies have allowed us to free our activities and interactions from the constraints imposed by our immediate and concrete experiences of time and space and to restructure those activities and interactions almost at will in the abstract domain of the global. The separation and delinking of time and space from each other and from their concrete experiential settings are what make the domain of the global possible. Social relations are thus “disembedded” or “lifted out” from their local contexts (Giddens 1990), transformed into vast and complex symbolic arrays that represent myriad social interactions, and projected into the realm of the global, where they become free to roam and intermingle in a rather fluid fashion.

The stuff of which the domain of the global is made comprises images, sounds, and words that blanket the planet and quickly reach almost everywhere through mass media; cultural products and icons — music, movies, television programs, sports and fashion, ideas and concepts, and even aspirations and values — that link societies far apart and virtually unknown to each other; and the enormous exchange of messages, data, and information through telecommunication networks and the Internet. In this domain, it is rather difficult to trace the paths followed by a specific transaction, for interactions take place at high speeds, are rather ephemeral, and can involve many agents simultaneously. The communications networks that sustain the domain of the global now allow human beings to converse with each other in a variety of many-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many patterns that were impossible until just a few years ago.

The domain of the networks consists of a bewildering multiplicity of combinations of exchanges of tangible and intangible goods — trade in products and services, power and influence relations, transfers of data and information — which flow through a myriad of identifiable channels and nodes interconnecting social groups all over the world.⁸

Interactions in the domain of the networks involve all kinds of organizations — public institutions, private corporations, and civil-society associations — whose interrelations create a tangled web of overlapping and intertwined networks of networks. The domain of the networks is constantly transforming itself, as connections between its constituent units are established and severed, new channels and nodes are created, old ones are destroyed, and the network units mutate and evolve.

Transgovernmental, transcorporate, and transassociational networks, along with the thick sets of relations between them, are the main types of structural arrangements found in the domain of the networks. As the hold of nation-states on international affairs has weakened during the last three decades, a host of new cross-border linkages between public agencies has emerged in full view. These transgovernmental networks involve regulatory agencies, executives, courts, armed forces, and legislatures that now routinely exchange information and coordinate their activities (Slaughter 1997). Transcorporate networks, comprising multinational enterprises and private firms operating at the international level through wholly owned subsidiaries, foreign partners, representatives, and agencies, together with strategic alliances of all types, have long been an established feature of the international economic scene. Also, a variety of civil-society organizations — ranging from citizens’ groups and professional associations to environmental and human-rights activists — have now formed regional and worldwide alliances, thus configuring a new set of transassociational networks whose international weight has increased considerably. Although states will continue to be the main unit for political decision-making in the fractured global order, the erosion of sovereignty is making them more porous and allowing transgovernmental, transcorporate, and transassociational relations to proceed in an increasingly decentralized manner.

The social relations reflected in the combinations of tangible and intangible goods exchanged in the domain of the networks are both partially embedded in, and partially disembedded from, the time- and space-bound local contexts of interaction. Long in the making, the domain of the networks owes its present richness to the technological innovations in transport and communications of the last five decades, which have facilitated new and more intensive few-to-many, few-to-few, and few-to-one — as well as one-to-few and many-to-few — patterns of interrelation and communication between human beings.

The domain of the local comprises those relations and transactions that are anchored in time and space and primarily constitute the production, exchange, and consumption of tangible goods and services, together with the corresponding information resources and personal interrelations needed for human beings and social groups to exist and evolve. This domain has been in existence since the dawn of humanity, and the social relations reflected in the transactions and interactions that comprise it are firmly embedded in the settings of our concrete lived experiences.

In the domain of the local, where most of the daily lives of people unfold, transactions are relatively easy to trace, and in this domain the prevailing patterns of interrelation and communication between human beings one to few, few to one, and few to few. This domain contains the extraordinarily rich range of face-to-face interactions between individuals that allows us to convey to each other, not only information about things, but also feelings, emotions, aspirations and values, which stand at the root of what it means to be human and confer on human beings their unique character.

As these three domains overlap, it is possible to identify social interactions located in the interfaces between them. For example, financial transactions that take place on a global scale — as well as money that never rests and moves constantly throughout the world’s financial channels and hubs — straddle the domain of the global and that of the networks. Point-to-point trade in goods and services through clearly identifiable routes initially requires localized production and ultimately involves localized consumption and therefore spans both the domain of the local and that of the networks.

In addition, some activities circumscribed in time and space can rise from the domain of the local, be processed and leveraged through the domain of the networks, and reach the domain of the global (for example, American English as the language of the Internet, tastes for Chinese food and Brazilian music, Western market-economy concepts and policies typified in the so-called Washington Consensus, designs derived from local cultures in developing regions). The reverse also frequently happens, as interactions in the domain of the global filter down through the domain of the networks and reach that of the local (for example, the tourist and travel industries focusing on countries and regions with rich historical heritages, the technique of music videos used to present local compositions and talent, highly mobile financial assets invested in medium- and long-term projects in a specific location). Santos (1995, p. 263) called the former “globalized localisms”; and the later, “localized globalisms.” Santos pointed out that in the context of a highly asymmetric fractured global order, the rich, or “core,” countries specialize in globalized localisms, whereas the poor, or “peripheral,” countries are left primarily with localized globalisms.

In economic terms, the domain of the local comprises what are known as “nontradeable goods,” such as personal services, retailing, local transportation, and heavy goods with high transport costs; the domain of the network comprises all types of tradeable goods, services, and information that are transportable and exchangeable over a fairly long distance; and the domain of the global includes what may be called “hypertradeable goods” and impersonal services, which can be sold, bought, and transferred in a nearly instantaneous fashion all over the world. Many of these goods and services are exchanged at a frenetic pace (currency trading, for example).

The emerging fractured global order, along with its three domains, shows a multiplicity of fault lines of political, economic, social, environmental, cultural, scientific, and technological nature; these faults overlap partially and often shift direction; they sometimes reinforce each other and at other times work at cross purposes. The overall picture they present is one of turbulence and uncertainty, in which a variety of contradictory processes open up a wide range of both opportunities and threats defying established habits of thought. Integration and exclusion coexist uneasily side by side in all domains and aspects of the fractured global order. All this is certainly in line with what characterizes periods of profound and fundamental transformation, such as the Renaissance (Heller 1981), and this is also the nature of the transition on which we are now embarked toward a post-Baconian age (Sagasti 1997a, b).

It has been argued that the fractured global order has long been in the making. Proponents of the “world-systems” view (Wallerstein 1974, 1983, 1995; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1980) and others (Ferrer 1996, for example) have maintained that the fractures that accompany the globalization process emerged as far back as the 16th century, with the first wave of Western European capitalist expansion. There is ample merit in tracing the historical roots of the fractured global order over several centuries — most notably to balance the lack of historical awareness of some analysts who view it as a fairly recent phenomenon.

Although we fully acknowledge the importance of a centuries-old perspective on globalization, we argue that the processes of accelerated political, economic, social, environmental, cultural, scientific, and technological change that have unfolded since World War II — and have rapidly acquired a planetary character — are creating a new setting for the evolution of interactions among the world’s peoples. In contrast to previous bursts of globalized exchanges, all of which took place within the framework of the Baconian program, the emerging fractured global order is deeply embedded in the transition to a post-Baconian age and is also having in a major effect on the character of this transition. Among other things, this transition demands a reinterpretation of progress and development, particularly in view of the fundamental changes taking place in our conceptions of the human condition.

The multiplicity of processes giving birth to a fractured global order contain ambiguities and inconsistencies that generate widespread confusion and uncertainty. It is necessary to dispel the notion that the variety of forces at play in the three domains of the fractured global order are all pointing in one general direction, whether positive or negative. Each and every one of these forces, along with any combination of them, can produce “good” or “bad” results. This depends on, among other things, the perspective from which they are viewed, the structure of power relations in the domains and aspects of the fractured global order under consideration, and the capacities of developing countries and regions to design and carry out strategies for overcoming their disadvantages.

The ambiguous nature of the fractured global order means that a premium must be placed on an accurate reading of rapidly shifting and closely interrelated trends. Even those that may be considered as having a positive effect can, at times, end up creating more harm than good, particularly in developing countries. For example, the increased availability of private capital in the financial markets of developing countries, resulting from the globalization of finance, may appreciate local currencies and make exports less competitive. Increased food aid, resulting from humanitarian concerns and the growing awareness of the impact of natural and human-made disasters, may discourage efforts to increase food production in the recipient countries. The desire to spread Western democratic practices, closely associated with the worldwide dissemination of the ideas about human rights and democratic governance, may lead to the imposition of inappropriate — even counterproductive — political conditions on access to markets in developed countries and international finance, considering local circumstances. Even the end of the Cold War, which was a clear international “good” by most accounts, is seen by some analysts as opening the door to a variety of long-suppressed regional conflicts (Mearsheimer 1990).

At the same time, some trends that may be considered as having negative effects may create new opportunities for developing countries and regions. Global warming, a clear negative for all humanity, may generate new initiatives for international cooperation and for transfer of resources from rich to poor countries. In the agreements reached at the 1997 Kyoto Conference of Parties of the International Panel on Climate Change, which set the target of a 5.2% reduction in global emissions from 1990 levels by 2008–12, a provision is included regarding “Clean Development Mechanisms,” or payments from industrialized to developing countries to preserve forests that function as carbon dioxide sinks. Costa Rica is among the first countries poised to take advantage of this agreement. Similarly, the accelerated development of new technologies, which has increased the knowledge gap between rich and poor countries, can be seen as a development that expands the pool of available technologies for developing countries to tap into. The newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia have done this over the last three decades. Also, enormous growth is occurring in social demands, which already tax the capacities of most developing countries to provide basic social services but can also be seen as a force that spurs institutional innovations to increase popular participation and reinforce democratic practices, thus transforming the roles of the state, the private sector, and civil society. This is illustrated by the growing role of grass-roots organizations providing social services in Latin America and South Asia.

In every transformation of “bads” into “goods” within the framework of the fractured global order, the capacity to adopt a perspective that highlights opportunities and the ability to design and put into practice strategies to take advantage of such opportunities becomes a critical asset for anyone who wishes to avert the apparently unfavourable consequences of globalization. A major adjustment of mind-sets will be required to fully exploit the room to manoeuvre offered in the turbulent context of the emerging fractured global order. For example, many dichotomies once deeply embedded in our habits of thought — competition versus collaboration, market forces versus state intervention, democracy versus authoritarian rule, global actions versus local solutions — are losing their sharp edges as contradictory forces appear to converge and reinforce each other at specific times and places. Corporations that compete fiercely in some markets form strategic alliances in others; government guidance and regulation are required to make markets work effectively; authoritarian rule coexists with free elections and a free press; and “think globally, act locally” solutions are now part of mainstream thinking and policy-making, especially on the environment.

Holm and Sorensen (1995, p. 6) suggested that “uneven globalization is best conceived as a dialectical process, stimulating integration as well as fragmentation, universalism as well as particularism, and cultural differentiation as well as globalization.” Yet, rather than a dialectical process in which thesis and antithesis lead to a synthesis, which is then transformed into a new thesis, the multiplicity of trends constituting the fractured global order would be better characterized as a set of paradoxical processes, in which mutually inconsistent and contradictory trends coexist without the prospect of resolution, at least in the near future. Changing circumstances may even turn these contradictions into convergences and coincidences.⁹

Moreover, unexpected turns of events in a turbulent environment suggest that social actors who would be unable to exert any influence in a more stable context may have the opportunity to shape the outcomes of the multiplicity of processes now unfolding on the world scene. This prompted Harland Cleveland to suggest that we are facing “an open moment for international leadership” (Cleveland 1993).

The knowledge fracture and the two civilizations

Because of its particular importance and the pivotal role it plays in shaping all the other dimensions of the fractured global order and its domains, the knowledge fracture merits special attention. Long ago, science superseded other ways of generating knowledge, and scientific research is now the main source for technological innovation. As a consequence, scientific and technological capabilities have become perhaps the most important asset in the quest to improve living standards.

However, modern science and technology have always had an ambiguous character, even though the cultural context in which they developed from the 17th to the mid-20th century ignored the dark side of their promises and the threats they posed. Over centuries, and especially during the last five decades, we have learned that science and technology do not always bring about improvements in the areas of human activity they affect. Despite the promises of Enlightenment rationalism and, even more, 19th-century positivism, progress in science and technology does not necessarily coincide with that in morality, society, or even the economy. The complex and rapidly shifting context of the emerging fractured global order, in which scientific and technological fractures are highly visible, is making this point in a painfully obvious way as we embark on the transition to the post-Baconian age. For example, in contrast to the Enlightenment vision of knowledge as a free and widely shared good, to be used for the benefit of all human beings, the growing economic value of research has generated a host of initiatives to secure property rights over scientific and technological knowledge. These mechanisms to appropriate that intangible good, knowledge, are primarily designed by government agencies, corporations, and institutions from countries with high levels of scientific and technological capability and imposed on poor countries without these capacities through international regimes over intellectual property rights.

The great divide between people with and those without the capacity to generate and use knowledge may rapidly become an impassable abyss. Given the great variety of national and local situations, to focus sharply on this divide it may be appropriate to speak metaphorically of “two civilizations” (Sagasti 1980). In each domain, the interaction of the two civilizations is asymmetrical: the first civilization has more of an affect on the second than vice versa.

The first civilization is based on the growth of science as the main activity generating knowledge, the rapid evolution of science-related technologies, the incorporation of these technologies into productive and social processes, and the emergence of new forms of working and living, deeply influenced by the worldview of modern science and scientific technology. Most of the high-income countries — where science, technology, and production are closely intertwined and form an endogenous scientific and technological base — belong to the first civilization (Sagasti 1979). The second civilization has a low capacity to generate scientific knowledge; a broad traditional technological base, on which a thin layer of modern imported technologies is superimposed; and a productive system with a rather small modern segment, closely linked to the economies of high-income nations, together with a larger traditional segment that is relatively isolated from the international economy. Most of the low-income countries of the developing world — where scientific research, technological development, and productive activities remain separate — have an exogenous scientific and technological base and would belong to the second civilization.

However, even though the distance between the first and second civilizations may be widening as a consequence of the knowledge explosion, during the past three decades a handful of developing countries have begun to establish the foundations to develop an endogenous scientific and technological base. In parallel, some high-income nations have been losing ground in scientific research, technological development, and the linkage of these two to productive activities. As a result, it is possible to find nations that have features of both the first and second civilizations.

Disjointed and even contradictory cultural forms coexist in the nations of the second civilization. These nations face difficult choices regarding the importance of tradition, with its hierarchies, codes, and rites, and the weight to be placed on reason — the foundation of modern science — with its capacity to create order or disorder and to transform or destroy. Taken to extremes, scientific and technological thinking threatens to reduce human beings to purely rational automatons. Conversely, attacks on scientific rationality — leveled from particular faiths, cultures, or traditions — threaten to retard or prevent change and may lead to stagnation.

In a fractured global order, the main challenge to the nations of the second civilization — with their legitimate diversity of cultures, perspectives and worldviews — is to harmoniously integrate science and technology, along with its material and intellectual manifestations, into the social and cultural heritage with which they achieve their sense of identity.¹⁰

Concluding remarks

The conceptual framework of the fractured global order does not postulate the existence of an overall coordinator to decide on the course of the contradictory processes of globalization and fragmentation, let alone of a conspiracy to run the world to exploit and debase the majority of its population. As has been the case throughout history, nobody is “in charge” of the turbulent processes creating a few winners and many losers. The various interconnected systems that make up the three domains of the fractured global order run according to their own logic and the logics of the interactions between them. Although this is no consolation to those who experience the anxieties and the pain of the transition to a new world situation, it suggests that the first task in confronting the threats of the fractured global order and taking advantage of the opportunities it affords is to understand the multiple driving forces of its domains and components, their changing nature, and the logic that animates them. Only then will it be possible to design strategies and policies to improve the condition of the excluded and marginalized.

Nevertheless, the absence of a deus ex machina to control the processes leading to the fractured global order does not mean they lack an overall direction. Their direction emerges from the prevailing promarket and antistate way of thinking in our times. It is leading, albeit in jagged and paradoxical manner, toward both greater integration and greater fragmentation in all realms of human activity. Moreover, those who benefit from such a state of affairs (primarily private firms and individuals associated with highly mobile capital and knowledge resources) exert a dominant influence in the world’s centres of political power. They also appear determined to thwart any effort to slow the pace of globalization or even to reflect on where are we now and explore whether the emerging fractured global order is where we want to be.¹¹

The processes leading to the emergence of the fractured global order can be appropriately characterized using the metaphor of the “juggernaut” that Anthony Giddens used to describe the process of modernization:

a runaway engine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent, but which also threatens to rush out of control and which could render itself asunder. The juggernaut crushes those who resist it, and while it sometimes seems to have a steady path, there are times when it veers away erratically in directions we cannot foresee. The ride is by no means wholly unpleasant or unrewarding; it can often be exhilarating and charged with hopeful anticipation. But so long as the institutions of modernity endure [we would substitute “fractured global order” for “institutions of modernity”], we shall never be able to control completely either the path or the pace of the journey. In turn, we shall never be able to feel entirely secure, because the terrain across which it runs is fraught with risks of high consequence.

(Giddens 1990, p. 139)

The main responsibility for finding ways to improve the living conditions in developing countries and regions that have so far not benefited from (or even been harmed by) the trends giving shape to the globalization juggernaut lies squarely on the shoulders of the leaders in these countries and regions. But they cannot help by railing against the forces shaping the fractured global order; the real choice is not about how to best fight globalization but about how to govern and manage it. Perhaps the juggernaut metaphor should give way to that of the surfer who rides huge waves and safely reaches the shore. He or she cannot control the complex and powerful movements of the waves but is nevertheless able to guide the surfboard to take advantage of the slightest changes in the direction of sea currents and winds. The surfer may even be allowed to hold the illusion that he or she is “steering” the waves to make them reach the shore.

However, even the most determined and well-designed efforts of leaders in developing countries and regions will yield no results if the international context remains heavily biased against their efforts. Thus, the international communities of nations, corporations, and civil-society associations have a most important role to play in removing constraints and creating favourable conditions for those who embark in the uncertain road to “development,” whatever meaning we may eventually give this word as we move into a new century and the post-Baconian age. As Streeten pointed out, “strategies should aim to select the positive impulses of globalization and encourage them, while minimizing the impact of negative impulses, or cushioning the losers against them. This cannot be done by combining globalization with laissez faire” (Streeten 1998, p. 45).

Perhaps the most important challenge the international community faces in the transition to the 21st century is to prevent the multiplicity of fractures that span all the domains of the emerging global order from creating self-contained, partially isolated pockets of mutually distrustful peoples, ignorant and suspicious of each other’s viewpoints, aspirations, potentials, and capabilities. It is essential to prevent these fractures from creating inward-looking societies — both between and within rich and poor nations — that relate to one another only through symbolic links forged by mass media or narrowly circumscribed economic transactions and that interact in ways fraught with conflicts that threaten human and environmental security. Efforts to meet this challenge imply a commitment to building bridges across the multiple fractures of the emerging global order and particularly the will to prevent the knowledge fracture leading to a world with two distinct and diverging civilizations and to give human beings — both individually and collectively — the opportunity to realize their full potential.

7. In addition, several analysts have begun to offer integrative perspectives on the emerging world order: Ramón Tamames (Tamames 1991), the Spanish economist and politician, presented a rather comprehensive review of the forces shaping the new international order; Richard Falk (Falk 1992) offered what he called a “post-modern” view on the prospects for a new world order; the Central Bureau of Planning of the Netherlands (CPBN 1992) prepared a report exploring three different scenarios in which economic, environmental, social, and institutional issues are put together to offer alternative views on how the world economy may evolve over the next 25 years; Bushrui et al. (1993) edited a volume in which they gathered scientific, technological, and cultural perspectives on the emergence of a fractured global order; and a volume edited by Diamond and Plattner (1993) examines the democratization dimension of the global order. Return

8. Castells (1996, p. 168) suggested that “under different organizational arrangements, and through diverse cultural expressions, [the organizational forms of the informational economy] are all based in networks. Networks are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and will be made” (Castells’ emphasis). Return
   
   
9. Morrison (1983, cited in Smith and Berg 1987, p. 3) stated the importance of paradoxical mind-sets in the following terms: “We stand in a turmoil of contradictions without having the faintest idea how to handle them: Law/Freedom; Rich/Poor; Right/Left; Love/Hate — the list seems endless. Paradox lives and moves in this realm; it is the art of balancing opposites in such a way that they do not cancel each other but shoot sparks of light across their points of polarity. It looks at our desperate either/ors and tells us they are really both/ands — that life is larger than any of our concepts and can, if we let it, embrace our contradictions.” For arguments in favour of an “incoherent” approach to foreign policy, which is quite close to the idea of a paradoxical stance in facing the fractured global order, see Luttwak (1998). Return
   
   
10. The late Argentinean physicist, Jorge Sabato, a pioneer of Latin American scientific and technological studies and policies, clearly stated the need to harmonize the Western drive for material progress with cultural traditions that confer a sense of identity: “We want development, but with siesta” (J. Sabato, at the Andean Pact conference, Lima Peru, Oct 1970). Return
    
    
11. A notable example of the refusal even to allow thinking about alternatives to the manic pace of globalization was the bill introduced by US Senator Robert Dole at the Second Session of the 104th Congress, in 1996, which sought to deny “any voluntary or assessed contribution to the United Nations or any of its specialized and affiliated agencies ... unless the President certifies that the United Nations or such agency, as the case may be, is not engaged in any effort to develop, advocate, promote, or publicize any proposal concerning taxation or fees on United States persons in order to raise revenue for the United Nations or any such agency.” The target of Senator Dole was the proposed “Tobin Tax” on international financial transactions, which is aimed both at reducing volatility in global financial markets and raising revenues for countries and international agencies, which UNDP staff and consultants were exploring at that time (Raffer 1998). Return

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